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Polio Eradication: How the War on Terror Has Led to the Persistence of Polio in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Nigeria 
 
Introduction: In 1988, the World Health Organization (WHO) initiated a campaign to eradicate 
the polio virus from the world population (Bari 2006). Since 1988, the WHO has used polio 
vaccines to successfully interrupt transmission of the disease to new individuals in all but three 
countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria (WHO 2012). This paper examines how The War 
on Terror, stated by President George W. Bush to be a war against every terrorist group of global 
reach and the governments that support these groups, has led the populations of Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Nigeria, as well as vaccinators and health officials in these countries, to adopt the 
culture of war (Bush 2001). The purpose of this paper is to examine how this culture, marked by 
insecurity, hostility, and distrust, has affected the polio eradication campaign. The insecurity felt 
by the populations of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria led Muslim and Taliban leaders in these 
countries to act out against all Western activity within their borders, including the polio 
vaccination campaign (Jegede 2007). Although Nigeria is not directly linked to the War on 
Terror, it participated in the culture of war through its shared Islamic faith with Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. By participating in the culture of war, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria have harmed 
eradication efforts and have allowed the polio virus to persist within their countries. If the war 
continues, it risks potentially unleashing the virus, paralyzing hundreds of thousands of children 
every year (Walsh 2012).  
 
The campaign to eradicate polio was officially initiated by the WHO in 1988; at the time, 
there were 350,000 cases of polio worldwide. Although the effort failed to eradicate the virus by 
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the year 2000 as it had intended to, by the year 2004 the number of cases had been reduced to 
1189, reaching an unprecedented low that warranted excitement about potentially eradicating the 
disease (Bari 2006). In 2006, Egypt and Niger dropped off the list of countries that are polio 
endemic, and India, which was regarded as one of the greatest challenges with regards to 
tackling the polio eradication initiative in the campaign’s early years, dropped off the list in early 
2012 (Bari 2006; Walsh 2012). As of November 2012, the only countries that remain on the list 
of polio endemic countries are Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan (WHO 2012). Of these three 
countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been directly and continuously tied into the War on 
Terror which was initiated in the early 2000s. In these countries, insecurity and distrust toward 
Western medicine and power created by the war have established a number of difficulties 
maintaining the vaccination campaign. Northern Nigeria, although not directly a part of the war, 
has participated in the culture of war by adopting these same insecurities on the basis of its 
religion, Islam. Evaluating the situation in these three countries makes it apparent that the War 
on Terror has created an insecure and distrustful culture within their borders, and their 
participation in this culture is at least partially responsible for the fact that they are still polio 
endemic countries. Contrasting these countries with countries that have successfully removed 
themselves from the list of polio-endemic countries further establishes this assertion.  
 Comparing Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria to other countries that have managed to 
eliminate polio within their borders makes it obvious that although it is possible that other factors 
have contributed to these countries remaining polio endemic, there is probably a single trait that 
these countries share in common that causes them to continue to be polio endemic. To make this 
point clear, in 2001, India had more cases of polio than Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria 
combined, but by February of 2012, India had gone a whole year without any new polio cases 
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(WHO 2012; Walsh 2012). This remarkable victory over the polio virus has been largely 
attributed to India’s aggressive agenda deployed to fend off the disease: even now, after India 
has been free of new cases of polio for over a year and a half, the country continues a vigorous 
vaccination campaign intended to keep immunity against the virus strong in the country (Polio 
Global Eradication Initiative 2012). India, which had once been regarded as one of the toughest 
cases for polio eradication, overcame the challenge and eliminated the virus from the country 
through an organized vaccination drive. This suggests that the other countries that failed to 
eliminate the virus have not been able to do so because of their failure in establishing or 
maintaining such a drive. It has been proven that establishing a successful vaccination program, 
and thus eliminating the virus, is possible in densely populated areas with well established 
economies as well as in countries with barely developed economic systems where the population 
lives in sparse nomadic groups: Egypt and Niger, both of which were taken off the list for polio-
endemic regions in 2006, are an example of each of these respectively (Bari 2006). These 
countries are also examples of primarily Islamic nations (both have a population that is 80-90% 
Muslim) that have managed to defeat the polio virus, indicating that the religion itself is not the 
cause for the failure of the vaccination drives (CIA 2012). Ruling out population density, 
economic establishment, and religion leaves a short list for possible reasons that these three 
countries have been unable to eliminate the virus, and their participation in the culture of war 
seems to be, at least, one of the more credible of these possibilities. Once it is understood how 
this participation in the culture of war has interacted with the polio eradication campaign, there is 
little doubt that it is responsible for the failure to eradicate the polio virus. 
 In Pakistan and Afghanistan, war-induced actions have had direct effects in hindering the 
polio eradication process, but, more importantly, they have established insecurity and distrust 
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within all parties involved in the vaccination campaign, severely hindering progress. Local 
Taliban leaders have issued fatwas claiming that the polio vaccination campaign is an American 
plot to avert the will of God and to sterilize Muslim women (Warraich 2009). Furthermore, there 
have been instances recorded of the Taliban actually capturing and beating vaccinators (Warraich 
2009). Vaccination officials, including Abdul Ghani, who in 2004 was the head of the polio 
initiative in a county subdivision of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan 
called the Bejaur Agency, have been assassinated (Ahmad, 2007, p. 247). Significantly, the 
attack on Abdul Ghani in particular was not intended to assassinate him because he was a 
representative of the polio eradication campaign; according to health officials in the country and 
elders in Bajaur, the attack was merely one in a series of attacks against officials and pro-
government leaders in the country because the government was cooperating with the USA to 
fight Taliban and al-Qaeda groups within Pakistan (Ahmad, 2007, p. 247). Regardless, these 
actions have clear implications toward the vaccination campaign: because vaccinating is, 
essentially, hazardous, vaccinators and pro-vaccination officials have to risk their lives in order 
to deliver vaccines, and this makes it difficult to maintain the vaccination campaign. The effects 
of the war-induced actions do not end at the risk for the vaccinators, however. In 2007, the head 
of the National Polio Certification Committee in Pakistan was quoted as saying that “it is quite 
feasible to interrupt the transmission of poliovirus in Pakistan in the next few months, but NWFP 
and FATA, and Balochistan are the greatest threat to this goal” (Ahmad, 2007, p. 247). In these 
regions, bombings, Taliban and Al-Qaeda presence, and anti-American propaganda delivered by 
these two groups has taken their toll. There is a mass insecurity, both on the part of the 
vaccinators and on the part of those who would be receiving the vaccines, created, directly, as 
fallout of the War on Terror (Ahmad, 2007, p. 247). Even if the war were to be declared over 
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tomorrow, it is uncertain whether the distrust created by sterilization rumours pertaining to the 
polio vaccines or the insecurity felt by the vaccinators in dangerous regions of Pakistan and 
Afghanistan would be alleviated, and, as such, we would have no assurance that the course of the 
campaign would advance any differently because the culture of war would persist even after the 
war has ceased. By participating in this culture, vaccination officials and vaccine recipients in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan are ensuring the persistence of the virus. 
 Despite the fact that Nigeria is not directly linked to the War on Terror, it has, similarly 
to Afghanistan and Pakistan, suffered of war-induced insecurity and distrust toward Western 
medicine. The difference is that in Nigeria, the insecurity had existed prior to the War on Terror, 
and this insecurity seemed to lend credibility to rumours created and spread by the war. First, as 
Ayodele Samuel Jegede puts it in his article titled “What Led to the Nigerian Boycott of the 
Polio Vaccination Campaign?”, access to basic healthcare in Nigeria is very limited, and 
vaccinators walking from door to door offering families medicine that will supposedly protect 
them from crippling disease is a bizarre, foreign concept that does not seem credible (Jegede, 
2007, p. 73). Secondly, in 1996, a meningitis drug trial conducted by Pfizer in Nigeria did not 
obtain official approval before testing began, and at least one of the patients whose condition 
worsened after being placed on the experimental drug was not switched over to the gold standard 
drug once it was clear that the experimental drug was not helping, as ethical guidelines suggested 
ought to be done (Wise 2001). Once Nigerian officials began to look into this, families sued 
Pfizer over the drug trials, and as the Nigerian population became aware of the study, suspicions 
toward Western medicine began circulating in Nigeria, and there is no doubt that these 
suspicions were still fresh in their minds with the initiation of the War on Terror (Jegede, 2007, 
p. 73). Thus, when the war began and rumours circulated pertaining to polio vaccinations, these 
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rumours almost definitely drew credibility from Nigeria’s past experience with Western 
medicine and the population’s perception of the concept of door-to-door vaccination, and both of 
these factors enhanced the insecurity and distrust that Nigerians felt from perceived dangers 
created by the war. As is the case with Afghanistan and Pakistan, what Nigerians feel toward 
polio vaccinators and the vaccination campaign has a significant impact on the progress and 
success of the polio eradication effort, as it becomes increasingly difficult to protect a population 
from the polio virus if they are resistant to the eradication effort. 
The reason Nigerians became a part of the culture of war is fairly straight-forward and 
the ramifications have been, perhaps, the most evident over time: the northern part of Nigeria 
was historically colonized by Islamic Jihadists, and, because they perceive the War on Terror as 
war against Islam, they fear that they will somehow become a target of America. This almost 
directly translates into fear of the polio vaccination campaign: in an article reported by News24, 
a man speaking for the governor of Kano (a northern Islamic state of Nigeria) is quoted as saying 
that “Since September 11, the Muslim world is beginning to be suspicious of any move from the 
Western world…Our people have become really concerned about polio vaccine” (Jegede, 2007, 
p. 73). An important thing to note is that southern Nigeria was historically colonized by the 
British; lately, the government of Nigeria has been shifting toward the south (Jegede, 2007, 
p.73). In the 1980s, the Nigerian government established a population control law that limited 
the number of children a woman may have to four: with the shift of the government, some have 
come to regard this population control law as an attempt to comply with the will of the West, as 
the Western world is who colonized southern Nigeria (Jegede, 2007, p. 73). This creates a direct 
claim that the West, America included, is trying to reduce the number of Nigerians (this 
perception is actually shared by southern Nigerians) (Jegede, 2007, p. 73). Coupled with the 
War	  and	  Polio	  8	  
	  
insecurity and distrust toward Western medicine and the beginning of the War on Terror, 
Nigerians’ fear of the West, particularly in northern Nigeria, has manifested itself in the form of 
rumours that the polio vaccination campaign is spreading infertility, AIDS, and carcinogens 
(Jegede, 2007, p. 73). Soon into the 2000s, the northern Nigerian political and religious leaders 
issued a ban on polio vaccines on this basis, and by 2003, the World Health Organization was 
sounding the alarm that “a halt to immunisation programmes and a resulting surge in polio cases 
in northern Nigeria is threatening the entire global polio eradication campaign, jeopardising 15 
years of work, US$3 billion of investment on vaccines and surveillance, and the efforts of 10—
20 million volunteers” (Kapp, 2003, 1631). In that same year, the number of cases of polio in 
Nigeria rose to over 200, meaning that Nigeria hosted about half the world’s cases of polio 
because of the vaccination ban (Kapp, 2003, 1631). There was much effort made by the Nigerian 
government to dispel rumours that the polio vaccination was unsafe, but efforts were 
unsuccessful: the internal insecurity and distrust toward America and the Western world in 
Nigeria was so great that many, if not most, northern Nigerians thought they were safer allowing 
polio to spread than they were accepting the WHO’s vaccines. As a matter of fact, in 2004, the 
Kano state government even called their actions “…a lesser of two evils, [a sacrifice of] two, 
three, four, five even ten children to polio [rather] than allow hundreds of thousands or possibly 
millions of girl-children likely to be rendered infertile” (Jegede, 2007, p. 73). This, if nothing 
else, shows that although it is not literally a part of the War on Terror, northern Nigeria, through 
its shared Islamic faith with the countries that are a part of the war, participated in the culture of 
war and allowed fear of the Western world because of the war to build on their distrust and 
insecurity toward Western medicine. Again, Nigeria’s participation in the culture of war is 
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directly jeopardizing the polio vaccination campaign and possibly ensuring that the virus persists 
for years to come.  
It is important to note that not all of the fear and insecurity felt by Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
and Nigeria is unfounded: there is evidence that there have been fake health initiatives over the 
course of the war that were designed for war-related purposes. Despite the fact that these health 
initiatives were not authentic, they have, just as much as the fake rumours that have spread, taken 
their part in further contributing to the fear and insecurity felt by these countries and establishing 
these countries’ credibility in evading Western medicine. As a primary example, in 2011, Dr. 
Shakil Afridi conducted a fake Hepatitis B door-to-door vaccination campaign in Pakistan while 
working for the American Central Intelligence Agency (Larson 2012). The purpose of this fake 
vaccination drive was to collect blood samples in order to confirm the location of Osama Bin 
Laden in Pakistan (Larson 2012). The doctor met trial in Pakistan and was sentenced to 33 years 
in prison for treason, but this did not reduce the effect of his actions (Larson 2012). Whilst 
hepatitis B vaccine drives do not typically go from door to door, polio vaccination drives do. In 
response to his actions, the distrust toward the polio vaccination campaign in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan intensified: when vaccinators showed up to doors, parents now had palpable reason 
to believe that these vaccinators could be working for the American government and that they 
could be trying to harm their families. The results were immediately visible. Vaccinators started 
having trouble getting the parents to draw their children out, and the governments and WHO 
officials are still working in joint efforts to assure the populations of Afghanistan and Pakistan 
that the polio vaccines are indeed polio vaccines and that they are safe (Teepu 2012). The 
numbers also reveal the consequences of the actions taken by the Central Intelligence Agency: in 
2011, the number of cases in each Afghanistan and Pakistan jumped by about fifty, reaching 81 
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in Afghanistan and 198 in Pakistan (WHO 2012). It is probable that the Central Intelligence 
Agency may have confirmed Osama Bin Laden’s location by other means and avoided damaging 
the credibility of the polio vaccination campaign in these countries; regardless, it is undeniable 
that the fake vaccination drive reinforced war-induced perceptions citizens of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan had about America and the WHO’s polio vaccination drive, directly jeopardizing the 
vaccination campaign. 
The evidence presented makes it clear that the polio vaccination drive has been harmed 
by an insecure and distrustful culture created in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria because of 
the War on Terror: although this paper does not make the claim that this war is the only reason 
that polio has persisted in these countries, it does make it abundantly obvious that the culture of 
war created within these countries by the War on Terror is a very prominent reason for the 
persistence of the virus. Both sides of the interaction have become a part of the culture. On the 
one hand, you have vaccinators and officials in Afghanistan and Pakistan who are afraid to 
continue administering vaccines because it potentially puts their lives at risk, and on the other, 
you have people in Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan who are being exposed to rumours that 
polio vaccines are a plot by the American government to sterilize or harm them. The results have 
been obvious: when Nigeria ordered a ban on the polio vaccination drive, cases of polio emerged 
in areas in central and western Nigeria where it had previously been eliminated, and the number 
of cases in Nigeria itself rose incredulously over the next few years (Jegede, 2007, p. 73). 
Similarly, the numbers in Afghanistan and Pakistan rose noticeably the year Dr. Afridi’s 
fraudulent vaccination drive was exposed, indicating that the war had created certain distrust 
within these countries and the doctor’s actions had enhanced this distrust (WHO 2012). Other 
countries that have not participated in the culture of war have managed to eradicate the polio 
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virus from within their borders, and these countries offer examples of diversely populated 
nations with a varying degree of economic development that have managed to eradicate the 
virus, and they also show that Islam itself is not in opposition to vaccination. From these 
observations, we may conclude that the polio virus has persisted within Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
and Nigeria at least in part because the War on Terror has created a culture of insecurity and 
distrust within these countries, and this conclusion points toward the very real possibility that we 
will continue to face the polio virus for years to come if nothing is done to mediate this problem. 
Failure to eradicate this virus now may have dire implications: allowing it to persist further may 
cause the virus to mutate, and if it spreads again, it has the potential to paralyze hundreds of 
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